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DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS

and the Courts). But the Cohn case5 7 holds that depreciation deductions
should be disallowed to the extent that the taxpayer underestimates the
proceeds to be realized upon resale. In the application, therefore, capital
gains on depreciable property 58 are totally eliminated, a result that is
impossible to reconcile with the adoption of Section 1231. What is more,
this same result is quite repugnant to the purpose behind the liberalized
depreciation method5 9 for it tends to block the incentive for a rapid turnover of depreciable property. So, it would appear that at long last, the
Treasury Department has achieved through the courts the curtailment
of capital gains treatment which it has been attempting to attain since
1947 through legislation.60
"Many inequities are inherent in the income tax. We multiply them
needlessly by nice distinctions which have no place in the practical administration of the tax law. "'1
J. P. GRAvS
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interesting question

con-

cerning the disposition to be made of income which had accumulated in a
testamentary trust for a longer period than permitted by law, was
recently presented to the Supreme Court of Illinois in the case of Murphy
v. Northern Trust Company.' In that case, the testator had left his
residuary estate in trust under a will dated in 1932 which directed the
trustee to pay his widow a specified sum monthly from the net income
thereof and to accumulate any sums in excess and to add them to the
57

Cohn v. United States, 259 F. 2d 371 (6th Cir., 1958).

58 Note 56, ante.
59 Note 49, ante. "The stimulus to investment through liberalized depreciation is most important with respect to the creation of new assets."
60 In 1947 and 1948 Congress held extensive Revenue Revision Hearings. The
Treasury Department submitted an accelerated depreciation report in an attempt
to reduce the effect of Section 117(j) of the 1939 Internal Revenue Code.

Congress, in adhering to a policy of encouraging the sale and purchase of capital
equipment failed to take any action on this attempt. Again in 1950 the Secretary
of the Treasury attempted to persuade Congress to treat losses on depreciable
property as capital rather than ordinary losses. Congress rejected this recommendation as it did a similar one drafted by the Committee on Federal Taxation of the
American Institute of Accountants and submitted to Congress during the hearings on the 1954 Code. Finally, on January 18, 1960, during the course of this
litigation, the President in his budget message to Congress, recommended that
gain on the sale of depreciable property be treated as ordinary income.
61 United States v. Lewis, 340 U. S. 590, 71 S. Ct. 522, 95 L. Ed. 560 (1951)
(Douglas, Dissenting).
1 17 Ill. (2d) 51g, 162 N. E. (2d) 428 (1959), affirming 20 Ii. App. (2d) 244,
155 N. E. (2d) 821 (1959).
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principal. The will further directed the trustee to divide the corpus and
accumulated income among certain remaindermen after the death of the
widow. When the testator died in 1937, the Illinois version of the socalled Thellusson Act 2 prohibited the accumulation of income for more
than twenty-one years from the death of the testator. After the permissible accumulation period had expired, the widow brought an action to
construe the will, claiming a right to the income so released. The surviving remaindermen named in the will also asserted a right thereto.8
The trial court decreed that the trustee should distribute the remainder
of the net income to the remaindermen and, on appeal, the Appellate
Court for the First District affirmed. The Supreme Court of Illinois,
following the granting of leave to appeal, reversed and remanded with
a direction that the released income was to pass by intestate succession
when it concluded that it was impossible, from the language of the will,
to identify the person or persons who would have been entitled to the
income if the proper accumulation thereof had not been directed.
The instant decision exposes the problem of the uncertainty as to
whom distribution of the void accumulation should be made. The statute
provided that such income shall go to and be received by such person or
persons as would have been entitled thereto if such accumulation had
not been directed. This provision would seem rather easy to apply. Yet
the courts are still posed with a problem of construction, as in the instant
case, where the testator made no express provision for the destination
of the released income. Thus, the crucial question which faced the court
was whether the will indicated such a person or persons entitled to the
income and what was to be done if it did not.
It was strongly urged by the trustee on behalf of the remaindermen
that in determining where the released income goes, the testator's intention is controlling.4 The trustee claimed that the testator clearly intended
his widow to have not more than three-hundred dollars per month, and,
that his collateral heirs should take his entire estate subject only to the
monthly annuity to his widow. To this, the widow responded that the
will showed an equally firm intention that none of the remaindermen
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. (1937), Vol. 1, Ch. 30, § 153. The Statute was first enacted in
1907.
3The testator's scheme for the ultimate distribution of his estate apparently
contemplated a division thereof, after the death of his widow, into equal shares
among his brothers and sisters or to the lawful issue of any one of them (except
as to one named sister) who failed to survive the widow, with a further provision
against lapse in case any remainderman died without issue surviving at the time
for distribution.
4 Webb v. Webb, 340 Il1. 407, 172 N. E. 730 (1930) ; Carlberg v. State Savings
Bank, 312 Ill. 181, 143 N. E. 441 (1924).
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should take anything under the will during her life and that only the
survivors should take anything at all. The court noted that the will did
not direct a periodic distribution of the released income to anyone. The
court further deemed that the presumption against intestacy did not
warrant it to supply the omitted provision, under the guise of construing
the will, when no language was used to show an intention of the testator
to dispose of the property. 5 Consequently, the court construed the will
as if the testator made no effective disposition of the released income with
the result that it passed by intestate succession.
Although there have been earlier Illinois cases concerning the interpretation and application of the Thellusson Act, these decisions did
not make a specific adjudication as to the proper distribution of income
released by the operation of the statute.e Of the other states which have
enacted Thellusson statutes, only the Pennsylvania Act contains similar
phraseology in the section relevant in the instant case.7 However, the
precise factual situation involved in the instant action has never been
presented in the Pennsylvania cases, and, besides, construction of the
Pennsylvania Act by her courts is substantially different from that of
the Illinois decisions so as to render those Pennsylvania cases of very little
8
persuasiveness in this state.
Though the Illinois and Pennsylvania type of provision for the disposition of illegal accumulation gives rise to a number of questions, the
"next eventual estate" type such as is found in New York does not neces5 Hampton v. Dill, 354 Ill. 415, 188 N. E. 419 (1933)
Glaser v. Chicago Title
& Trust Co., 393 Ill. 447, 66 N. E. (2d) 410 (1946).
6 Booth v. Krug, 368 Ill. 487, 14 N. E. (2d) 645 (1938); Webb v. Webb, 340 Ill.
407, 172 N. E. 730 (1930) ; French v. Calkins, 252 Ill. 243, 96 N. E. 877
(1911) ; Walliser v. Northern Trust Co., 338 Ill. App. 263, 87 N. E. (2d) 129 (1949) ;
Carlberg v. State Savings Bank, 312 Ill. 181, 143 N. E. 441 (1924); Sullivan v.
Harris Trust & Savings Bank, 8 Ill. App. (2d) 397, 132 N. E. (2d) 69 (1956).
7 Purdon's Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 20, § 3251.
5 In Pennsylvania, directions to accrue and to add the accumulations to the
principal of the fumd during the life of a life-tenant are bad altogether; Lowe's
Estate, 326 Pa. 375, 192 A. 405. This view has been rejected in Illinois where only
accumulations in excess of the permitted periods are void : Sullivan v. Harris
Trust & Savings Bank, 8 Ill. App. (2d) 397, 132 N. E. (2d) 69 (1956) ; Webb v.
Webb, 340 Ill. 407, 172 N. E. 730 (1930). A different, though not necessarily inconsistent, result was reached in the decision of In re Maris' Estate, 301 Pa. 20,
151 A. 577, wherein the testator directed that all the net income from a testamentary trust be paid to his wife, specifying, however, that all stock dividends be
accumulated as principal. The Court, in holding that dividends must be considered as income and that the wife was entitled thereto, sets forth a technical
distinction between a vested estate in possession and vested estate not in possession stating that the beneficiary must hold a vested possessory interest in order to
be entitled to the income released under the Pennsylvania Act. See also Thistle's
Estate, 263 Pa. 60, 106 A. 94 (1919) ; In re Wright's Estate, 277 Pa. 69, 75 A. 1026
(1910).
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sarily provide a solution to these problems. 9 The New York Real Property Law states that where no valid direction for the accumulation of
income is given, such income shall belong to the persons presumptively
entitled to the "next eventual estate".10
The wording of the statute
immediately raises the question as to who is the person presumptively
entitled to the "next eventual estate"?" Also there is a question whether
the Statute is applicable in a case where an illegal direction for an
accumulation can be stricken out, and the creating instrument still con12
tains a valid direction for the disposition of the accumulation.
In 1953, the Illinois Thellusson Act was amended in order to remove
the ambiguity as revealed by the instant decision. The amendment provides that the illegally-accumulated income should "go to and be received
by the person in whom the beneficial interest in the corpus of the estate
from which such income was derived is vested"13 Although the amendment has no retroactive effect, one might have expected the court to render a decision in accord with this recent enactment in order to remove
the cloud of uncertainty connected with void accumulations of income
created prior to 1953. Nonetheless, the court did attain a different result,
but by doing so, it left corporate and individual trustees still faced with
the disquieting situation as to who is entitled to void accumulations of in
come which are not covered by the recent amendment.
However, once a will is construed to the effect that the testator made
no disposition of the accumulated income, the decision provides an answer
as to the destination of the accumulation by holding that such residuary
income released under the Act will pass as intestate property to those
who are entitled under the Statute of Descent.
D.

W.
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9 For a thoughtful discussion of the Thellusson Act and the problems arising
under it, see Simes, "Statutory Restrictions on the Accumulations of Income",
7 U. Chi. I. Rev. 409 (1940).
10 N. Y. Real Prop. Law § 63. There is no "next eventual estate" provision in the
New York Personal Property Law, but it has been held that the provision of the
Real Property Law applies to personalty, In re Harteau, 204 N. Y. 292, 97 N. E.
726 (1912).
11 It has been said that "The persons presumptively entitled to the next eventual
estate are those who are entitled to the estate which is to take effect at the end
of the period during which the rents and profits are undisposed of, or are invalidly
accumulated." In re Kohler, 231 N. Y. 353, 132 N. E. 114 (1921). See also annotation with respect thereto in 48 C. J. 996, Note 46 and cases there cited.
12 See Matter of Hoyt, 116 App. Div. 217, 101 N. Y. Supp. 557 (1906) (aff.
189 N. Y. 511, 81 N. E. 1166 (1907)).
13 I1. Rev. Stat. 1959, Vol. 1, Ch. 30, § 153.

